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ABSTRACT
Objective Tobacco companies have made extensive
efforts to build alliances against comprehensive smoke-
free legislation. This article analyses the interaction
between actors who opposed the development of the
European Council Recommendation on smoke-free
environments.
Methods Drawing on data from 200 policy documents
and 32 semistructured interviews and using qualitative
textual analysis and organisational network analysis,
opponents’ positions on, and responses to, the policy
initiative, strategies to oppose the policy, and efforts to
build alliances were investigated.
Results The non-binding nature of the policy, scientiﬁc
evidence and clear political will to adopt EU-wide
measures combined to limit the intensity of commercial
sector opposition to the comprehensive EU smoke-free
policy. Most tobacco companies, led by the
Confederation of European Community Cigarette
Manufacturers (CECCM), voiced reservations against the
proposal, criticised the policy process and fought
ﬂanking measures on product regulation. However, some
companies focused on instigating harm reduction
debates. These divergent approaches and the reluctance
of other commercial actors to demonstrate solidarity with
the tobacco sector prevented the establishment of a
cohesive commercial sector alliance.
Conclusions The comparatively limited opposition to
EU smoke-free policy contrasts with previous accounts of
tobacco industry resistance to tobacco control. While
context-speciﬁc factors can partially explain these
differences, the paper indicates that the sector’s
diminished credibility and lack of unity hampered
political engagement and alliance building. Industry
efforts to emphasise the beneﬁts of smokeless tobacco
during smoke-free policy debates highlight the potential
of harm reduction as a gateway for tobacco companies
to re-enter the political arena.
BACKGROUND
Since Ireland’s comprehensive smoke-free policy in
2004, substantial progress has been made across the
EU in protecting citizens from secondhand smoke
(SHS) in public places. Corresponding national
policy debates have confronted industry lobbyists
with an unprecedented challenge,1 leading to
tobacco companies contesting scientiﬁc evidence,2
undermining policy development3 and mobilising
opposition among smokers’ rights groups,4 trade
unions,5 hospitality organisations6 and companies
focused on technical responses to SHS exposure.7
This article analyses the responses of tobacco
companies, tobacco-related and other commercial
actorsi to the development of the Council
Recommendation for smoke-free environments,
which recommends that member states “provide
effective protection from exposure to tobacco
smoke in indoor workplaces, indoor public places,
public transport and, as appropriate, other public
places”.8 This non-binding policy was the EU’s
endorsement of comprehensive national smoke-free
policies and the WHO’s Framework Convention on
Tobacco Control (FCTC) Article 8 guidelines.
Initiated in 2007 by a European Commission
Directorate General for Health and Consumers’
(DG SANCO) Green Paper,9 negotiations took
almost 3 years. Following consultations with stake-
holders and an impact assessment, the Council
Recommendation was adopted in 2009.8 This paper
investigates opposition to the initiative, interactions
between tobacco company representatives,
tobacco-related actors and other commercial actors,
efforts to build alliances and barriers encountered in
seeking to inﬂuence the policy process. As the ﬁrst
EU tobacco control initiative adopted following
FCTC ratiﬁcation, the Council Recommendation
provides an interesting opportunity to critically
examine commercial sector engagement in EU
tobacco control policy and efforts to prevent indus-
try interference after international endorsement of
FCTC Article 5.3 (which requires all parties to the
treaty to protect policies on tobacco control “from
commercial and other vested interests of the
tobacco industry”10).
METHODS
The study used documentary and interview data to
investigate opposition to comprehensive EU smoke-
free policy. Approximately 200 publicly available
documents were reviewed, including policy drafts,
minutes of meetings, consultation submissions,
brieﬁngs and reports. Documents offering indepth
information about stakeholders’ views were themat-
ically analysed. To investigate interactions between
the various actors opposing EU smoke-free policy,
all organisational responses submitted to the
Commission’s public consultation on smoke-free
iThis follows the European Commission’s categorisation
of tobacco-related actors (eg, tobacco growers,
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, trade unions) as
having a commercial interest in tobacco consumption,
distinguishing them from other commercial, non-tobacco
actors and representatives of other industry sectors (eg,
hospitality industry representatives, ventilation industry
representatives and representatives of general trade
associations).
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environments (n=176) underwent a structural network analysis,
including those from 35 organisations which the Commission
categorised as tobacco-related organisations. Each organisation
was registered as a node and assigned attributes, including
organisation type and position on the proposal. Two organisa-
tions were recorded as having a relationship if: (1) A was men-
tioned as a collaborating partner on the website or consultation
submission of B; and/or (2) A cited three or more references in
its submission which were also cited by B; and/or (3) plagiarism
detection software showed that A’s submission was at least 40%
identical to B’s. Data were analysed using UCINet V.611 and
graphically depicted using NetDraw.12 To divide the main com-
ponent of the network into groups based on their connected-
ness, the Girvan Newman algorithm was applied.13 This
identiﬁed two distinct components which, based on analyses of
node characteristics and interview data, clearly represented two
distinct communities. All organisations in the larger component
(n=64) were health-related and supported comprehensive EU
smoke-free policy, whereas the smaller component (n=24) com-
prised of tobacco industry organisations that opposed the initia-
tive and argued for extensive exemptions.14
Qualitative data were gathered through semistructured, narra-
tive interviews with 35 individuals involved in negotiating the
Recommendation. Interviewees were purposively sampled from
a list of key individuals identiﬁed via the documentary review.
Forty eight individuals were contacted, of which six declined
and ﬁve did not respond. The ﬁnal sample included decision
makers (politicians, civil servants, n=5), representatives of
health advocacy organisations (n=13), professional organisa-
tions (n=1), scientiﬁc institutions (n=4), social partner organi-
sations (trade associations, trade unions, n=4), the tobacco
sector (n=4), ventilation industry (n=1) and other commercial
sector bodies (n=3). Based on documentary review and infor-
mal pilot discussions, an interview topic guide was developed,
combining a narrative part and open-ended questions.
Interviews were conducted by HW between March and July
2011, asking interviewees to recall experiences of engaging in a
process undertaken 5–8 years previously. Twenty two intervie-
wees, who wanted to remain anonymous, suggested descriptors
for use in publications, with the desire for anonymity reﬂected
in some vague descriptors used below. Interviews were recorded
and transcribed verbatim, except interviews with two tobacco
industry representatives who preferred that the interviewer took
notes. Using QSR NVivo,15 a hermeneutic analytical procedure
was followed entailing iteratively identifying themes, coding and
thematically analysing data.16 Codes were repeatedly compared
until analysis of additional interviews did not generate substan-
tively deeper insights. Ethical approval was obtained from the
Research Ethics Committee, School of Health in Social Science,
University of Edinburgh. A previous publication provides
a detailed account of study design and methodological
approach.17
With high non-response and rejection rates among tobacco
industry representatives (4 and 6, respectively, of 14 contacted),
and despite intensive recruitment efforts, only four interviewees
could provide internal insights into the industry’s responses.
This may reﬂect reluctance to engage with a researcher who had
previously examined industry efforts to obstruct policy.18–20 The
analysis, therefore, draws on third parties’ observations of
tobacco industry actions. Interviews with other commercial
sector representatives, particularly those linked with
tobacco-related organisations, provided particularly useful infor-
mation about opposition to EU smoke-free policy.
FINDINGS
Tobacco industry opposition: absence of a uniﬁed response
Contrasting ﬁerce industry opposition against national smoke-
free policies,3 4 6 21 22 tobacco industry representatives reported
that there “had not been much commitment” and the industry’s
response to the initiative had not produced “the well-oiled
lobbying campaign that you might think it would have been”.
These reports were corroborated by interviews with health
advocates who described tobacco industry lobbying as limited,
and the comparatively few consultation submissions from
tobacco-related organisations (n=35, compared to 81 submis-
sions from health-related organisations).23 The analysis,
however, provided clear evidence of resistance to comprehensive
EU smoke-free policy. Below, we distinguish between (1)
tobacco company representatives, (2) tobacco-related actors
(other than tobacco companies) with commercial interests in
tobacco consumption and (3) non-tobacco or other commercial
actors with primary interests beyond tobacco. Table 1 lists all
actors identiﬁed as opposing comprehensive EU policy, accord-
ing to their links with tobacco companies.
While various actors publicly voiced reservations about com-
prehensive smoke-free policy, the data suggest that the strongest
counterarguments originated from tobacco manufacturers and
tobacco-related actors. They advocated for an “EU-wide smoking
ban with exemptions”, designated smoking rooms and exclusion
of hospitality venues, private clubs, research laboratories and
residential places.24 This preference resembled some member
states’ policies, which were difﬁcult to enforce and provided
loopholes by allowing smoking in multiple public venues.3 25
Several tobacco companies, including British American Tobacco
(BAT), Japan Tobacco International ( JTI), Imperial Tobacco
Group (ITG), Gallaher, Ritmeester, Gunnar Stenberg, and
European and national tobacco manufacturers’ associations
(TMAs), formed the core opposition. The plagiarism detection
analysis showed that the wording of submissions from the
Confederation of European Community Cigarette
Manufacturers (CECCM, a European TMA representing com-
panies including BAT, Gallaher, ITG and JTI), Gallaher Norway
AS, Gunnar Stenberg AS, BAT Cyprus and the Estonian, Irish,
Latvian and Lithuanian TMAs were almost identical (96–100%
similarity according to Turnitin’s index of originality).
Submissions of the European Smoking Tobacco Association
(ESTA), BAT Malta, and Finnish and Hungarian TMAs also
showed very strong similarities (66–95%) with each other and
the above organisations. An interviewee from a tobacco whole-
saler reported that tobacco-related actors had exchanged draft
texts and held “short rounds of agreements…and a vote” to
achieve a common position and agree on a shared strategy to
oppose the EU initiative. Joint actions were described as being
led by CECCM in Brussels, which urged national TMAs to
submit identical responses to achieve a ‘multiplier effect’
(tobacco wholesaler representative) and demonstrate strong and
broad opposition. CECCM’s centrality (degree centrality=16),
which was considerably higher than that of other alliance
members, and the alliance’s comparatively high centralisation
(44.7%) and compactness (0.58) scores conﬁrmed CECCM’s
prominent status, positional advantage and ability to manage the
hierarchically structured alliance. The sociogramme of opponents
who submitted responses to the consultation (ﬁgure 1) illustrates
the close collaboration between tobacco manufacturers and
CECCM’s central position within the industry alliance.
Despite efforts to advance a uniﬁed response, tobacco com-
panies seemingly struggled to fully align their positions.
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Contrasting the CECCM-led alliance, Philip Morris’ (PMI)
response supported “a total smoking ban…in general public
indoor spaces, such as stores, banks, hospitals, public buildings,
and public transportation” without suggesting exemptions for
speciﬁc venues.26 Mirroring PMI’s attempts to argue for an abo-
lition of the ban on snus under the revision of the EU tobacco
products directive in 2010.27 PMI used the smoke-free debate
as an opportunity to promote deregulation of alternative
tobacco products. (EU law28 prohibits the marketing of oral
tobacco across the EU apart from in Sweden, a ban which has
been subject to repeated tobacco industry opposition.29) PMI’s
consultation response advocated product modiﬁcation as a
means to reduce harm, called for consideration of the ‘beneﬁts’
of smokeless tobacco and suggested exemptions to EU smoke-
free policy by allowing consumption of non-combustible
tobacco products.26 Employing similar rhetoric, the
International Smokeless Tobacco Company Inc (ISTC), an afﬁli-
ate of the Altria subsidiary US Smokeless Tobacco Company,
highlighted comparatively lower risks of smokeless tobacco and
“support in the international public health community for
adopting a tobacco harm reduction strategy”.30 This depicted
agreement with supporters of comprehensive smoke-free policy
who saw harm reduction as central to comprehensive tobacco
control.30 ISTC called on the Commission to introduce “smoke-
less tobacco availability as a complementary policy option” to
EU smoke-free policy.30 In the network structure analysis, PMI
emerged as an outlier (ie, a member of neither the tobacco
industry or tobacco control alliances), whereas the ISTC’s pos-
ition mirrored its unique location as the only tobacco industry
actor in an alliance otherwise comprised of organisations with
clear interests in health and tobacco control (ﬁgure 2).
Complementing documentary data, the interviews provided
evidence of tobacco industry attempts to instigate, join and
frame debates on, and direct attention towards, harm reduction.
Such debates were conceived as offering unique public relation
opportunities to reposition tobacco companies as reasonable
and legitimate stakeholders who could add value to the policy
process, lobby for removal of restrictions on smokeless tobacco
products, and depict harm reduction policies as necessary
adjuncts to prohibiting smoking in public places.
Everything the tobacco industry has been doing in the last few
years is…trying to ﬁnd as many policy hooks as they can, includ-
ing [the Recommendation], in order to build up support for snus
as a safer alternative or even as a kind of a smoking cessation aid.
(Lobbyist)
While keen to avoid being perceived as strongly opposing a
policy aimed at protecting citizens from SHS harm, the
CECCM-led tobacco industry alliance worked to hamper the
policy process and derail the initiative. CECCM’s submission
strongly criticised DG SANCO staff for an approach to stake-
holder consultations depicted as biased and undemocratic, and
instead called for “dialogue and consultation with all interested
stakeholders, including the tobacco sector” and for what it
framed as a more inclusive approach to policy development.24
Representatives of tobacco wholesalers, the cigar industry and
smokers’ rights’ organisations followed CECCM’s lead in ques-
tioning the policy assessment that had been undertaken, arguing
that the impact of smoke-free policies could not be accurately
and comprehensively assessed.31–33 One letter from Roberto
Zanni, CECCM’s chairman, made available by an interviewee,
indicates that efforts to disrupt the policy process culminated in
July 2008 when tobacco companies turned to other DGs to
denounce DG SANCO’s approach. Zanni R. [Letter from
Roberto Zanni to Alexander Italianer regarding impact assess-
ment on the follow-up initiative on smoke-free environments].
Table 1 Tobacco company representatives, actors with commercial interests in tobacco consumption and non-tobacco actors involved in
negotiations
Tobacco company
representatives
Actors with commercial
interests in tobacco Non-tobacco actors
Public collaboration (eg, joint submission) with (other)
tobacco companies
▸ Confederation of European
Community Cigarette
Manufacturers
▸ British American Tobacco
▸ Japan Tobacco International
▸ Imperial Tobacco Group
▸ Gallaher
Apparent collaboration (ie, strong similarity between
submissions) with (other) tobacco companies
▸ European Smoking Tobacco
Association
▸ Gunnar Stenberg AS
▸ BAT Malta
▸ BAT Cyprus
▸ Estonian TMA
▸ Irish TMA
▸ Latvian TMA
▸ Lithuanian TMA
▸ Finnish TMA
▸ Hungarian TMA
▸ Gallaher Norway AS
▸ Imported Tobacco Products
Advisory Council UK
Demonstrable links (eg, information exchange, informal
meetings, financial links, membership) with tobacco
companies
▸ Freedom Organisation for the
Right to Enjoy Smoking
Tobacco
▸ European Tobacco Wholesalers
▸ Tobacco Workers Alliance UK
▸ European Federation of Food,
Agriculture and Tourism Trade
Unions
▸ BusinessEurope
▸ German Employers’ Confederation
No demonstrable links with (other) tobacco companies ▸ International Smokeless Tobacco
Company Inc
▸ Philip Morris International
▸ European Alliance For Technical
Non-smoker Protection
BAT, British American Tobacco; TMAs, tobacco manufacturers’ associations.
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Personal communication, 2008. The letter to Alexander
Italianer, Deputy Secretary General of the European
Commission and Chairman of the European Commission
Impact Assessment (IA) Board, argued that “some of the meth-
odological approaches employed in conducting the IA may not
be entirely in line with the EU’s IA Guidelines” and questioned
whether DG SANCO’s IA complied with the European
Commission’s Better Regulation strategy.
Finally, interviews revealed considerable increases in tobacco
companies’ activity in the closing stages of the process. This
intensiﬁcation was triggered by the unexpected inclusion in the
policy draft of calls to revise the Tobacco Products Directive and
assess future EU policies regarding plain packaging and graphic
health-warning labels.34 One health advocate reported that
these ﬂanking measures had been strategically inserted by repre-
sentatives of governments supporting strong EU policy, calculat-
ing that late insertion would deprive opponents of time to
devise an effective strategic response. According to a tobacco
wholesaler representative, the industry was surprised by this
move and unable to mobilise sufﬁcient opposition to the pro-
posed ﬂanking measures. Despite “a huge amount of industry
lobbying trying to keep all mention of plain packaging out of
this recommendation” (public health advocate), industry repre-
sentatives were unable to prevent passage of the amended text.
Figure 1 Actors who opposed comprehensive EU smoke-free policy and their relationships with each other; Black square: tobacco manufacturer,
White circle: tobacco wholesaler, Light grey triangle: tobacco trade union, Dark grey diamond: social partner organisation.
Figure 2 All actors who submitted a response to the European Commission consultation on smoke-free environments and their relationships with
each other (main component only); Black triangle: tobacco-related actors, White square: health-related actors, Dark grey circle: local authorities,
Light grey diamond: social partner organisation.
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Factors reducing opposition to comprehensive EU
smoke-free policy
In ﬁghting comprehensive smoke-free policy, opponents argued
that health risks from SHS were ‘relatively minor’,35 insufﬁ-
ciently proven33 36 37 or unfounded.32 38 Interviews with public
health advocates, however, emphasised ‘conclusive evidence’ and
‘strong scientiﬁc consensus’ about the detrimental impacts of
SHS and health beneﬁts of comprehensive smoke-free policies as
signiﬁcantly impeding opposition. Policy evaluations in EU
member states were employed by health advocates to highlight
the feasibility, effectiveness and acceptability of comprehensive
smoke-free policies and the inadequacy of partial measures.39–42
The strong evidence base and momentum in adopting national
smoke-free legislation seemed to mobilise decision makers to
adopt measures at EU level. Exposure of previous tobacco indus-
try strategies was used to warn decision makers against industry
interference, with advocates reporting that industry representa-
tives were “trotting out the same arguments that they had trotted
out in all the other countries where smoke-free legislation had
been enacted”, so supporters “didn’t really have a very difﬁcult
job to do in rebutting the industry”.
These factors, however, only partially explain the limited
efforts of opponents in countering the development of the
Recommendation. Arguably as important was the EU’s restricted
scope to adopt binding smoke-free legislation due to its lack of
legal remit to harmonise national public health legislation, such
that opponents did not perceive the initiative as a substantial
threat. One tobacco industry representative, for example,
reported that “the pressure came off the cooker” and consider-
able downscaling of lobbying efforts as soon as it was clear that
binding legislation would not be supported in the Council of the
EU. Similarly, representatives of other industries reported that
the Recommendation was perceived as non-threatening and of a
low priority, reﬂecting the implausibility of legal consequences
and low probability of translation into national legislation.
Barriers to building an alliance against comprehensive EU
smoke-free policy
Notwithstanding their general reticence about increasing EU
regulation, membership links and previous collaboration with
tobacco companies, the data indicate limited opposition to com-
prehensive EU policy from social partners and pan-European
trade associations, like BusinessEurope (an organisation repre-
senting industry associations across Europe), the European
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the European Federation
of Food, Agriculture and Tourism Trade Unions (EFFAT), and
the European trade association representing hotels, restaurants
and cafés (HOTREC).43 44 In contrast to previous tobacco
industry success in building opposing alliances with like-minded
organisations,19 45 only one connection was identiﬁed between
a tobacco-related actor and a non-tobacco actor (the German
Employers’ Confederation, ﬁgure 1). Documentary data were
supported by interview accounts, revealing that interactions
between tobacco companies and representatives of other sectors
were largely conﬁned to information exchange. Reﬂecting on
the “fear of association” and the reluctance of other commercial
actors to publicly collaborate with tobacco companies, tobacco
industry representatives conﬁrmed that their attempts to build
alliances were frequently rejected, resulting in “restricted room
for manoeuvre” (tobacco wholesaler representative) and limited
opportunities to counter the policy.
In addition to the low priority afforded to the initiative by
pan-European organisations given the unlikelihood of binding
legislation, structural features of EU policymaking seemed to
further hamper alliance building. Pan-European commercial
sector organisations struggled to reach consensual positions on
the policy proposal, with several interviewees reporting cumber-
some discussions. A tobacco industry representative, for
example, reported that HOTREC had been “between a rock
and a hard place” in balancing views of national members
opposing the policy (primarily organisations from states with no
or partial national legislation) and those willing to support the
EU initiative (usually organisations from states with comprehen-
sive legislation). Reﬂecting on similar difﬁculties of aligning
diverse members, a representative of another umbrella organisa-
tion reported that having “to coordinate things with everyone…
[often led to]…very general and…non-committal” positions.
Pan-European organisations also seemed to carefully weigh
the beneﬁts of opposing a speciﬁc EU-level initiative against a
more general, long-term aspiration to be perceived as reason-
able, progressive and constructive stakeholders, supportive of
EU-wide cooperation. Strategic considerations about the impact
of their responses on their public image and desires to not
appear as “a kind of old-school, old type” but “modern” busi-
ness (social partner representative) inﬂuenced organisational
decisions on whether to demonstrate agreement with
tobacco-industry organisations. While reporting that they had
generally been opposed to comprehensive EU smoke-free policy
and met with tobacco company representatives to exchange
information and coordinate responses, several social partners
and non-tobacco trade representatives recounted a reluctance to
position themselves as tobacco industry allies. It is important to
note that the guidelines to FCTC Article 5.3 were adopted at
the third session of the Conference of the Parties in November
2008, that is, when EU smoke-free policy was negotiated.46
Aware of such discussions, other commercial sectors seemed
keen to distance themselves from the tobacco industry and
portray themselves as legitimate stakeholders, who took
“balanced” (social partner representative) positions on EU pol-
icies. A representative of one pan-European umbrella business
organisation with tobacco company membership, for example,
was eager to highlight that tobacco industry members did not
“punch above their weight” and that the organisation was “not
there only to represent the tobacco industry”. Contrasting the
tobacco industry’s use of companies which focused on technical
solutions to reducing SHS exposure as surrogates in national
smoke-free policy debates,7 47 a representative of the European
Alliance for Technical Non-Smoker Protection (EATNP)
reported that some EATNP members had refused any contact
with tobacco industry representatives because “they want to
avoid that they are, from an image point of view, shufﬂed onto
the side of the cigarette industry”. Instead, ventilation compan-
ies had sought to portray themselves as intermediaries in the
policy debates which were “situated right in the middle”
between the tobacco industry and public health organisations,
providing protection from SHS while allowing smoking in
public places (EATNP representative). Owing to the wide-spread
perception of ventilation companies as tobacco industry allies,
EATNP had, however, faced considerable constraints when
attempting to collaborate with public health representatives.
DISCUSSION
Previous research extensively documents tobacco industry
efforts to combat tobacco control policies, including national
smoke-free policies and the regulation of tobacco advertising
and tobacco products at EU level.3 48 WHO Director General
Margaret Chan has expressed anticipation of “well-orchestrated,
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well-funded, and aggressive resistance every step along the way”
as further tobacco control policies are adopted.49 By analysing
commercial sector opposition to EU smoke-free policy and
showing that tobacco company representatives and other com-
mercial actors carefully focused their lobbying on speciﬁc
aspects of the policy draft and process, this paper shows that the
legislative context strongly inﬂuences the dynamics and intensity
of industry opposition.
Two context-speciﬁc factors are particularly important in
interpreting the ﬁndings. First, the interview data show that the
non-binding nature of the proposed policy considerably shaped
opponents’ responses to the proposal. The fact that the EU is
not granted competence to harmonise national public health
legislation50 and its inability to adopt binding, enforceable legis-
lation aimed at protecting citizens from SHS seemed to consid-
erably reduce interest in, and opposition to, the initiative. Given
that non-binding EU policy was not perceived as a signiﬁcant
threat to their business, tobacco industry and (arguably more
important in terms of building broader alliances) other commer-
cial sector actors did not strongly oppose its adoption. The
policy’s focus on protecting vulnerable groups from the detri-
mental effects of SHS exposure,9 combined with substantial evi-
dence on the health impacts and the effectiveness of
comprehensive smoke-free policies, appeared to further reduce
opponents’ motivation and opportunities to counter EU level
action. These ﬁndings contrast literature outlining the industry’s
ﬁerce opposition to national smoke-free policies and recent EU
tobacco product regulation and trade-related tobacco control
measures.3 51 Contrasting the small number of consultation sub-
missions countering the European Commission’s proposal to
tackle SHS exposure, the recent consultation on the EU Tobacco
Products Directive generated over 2300 industry submissions,
most voicing strong reservations about the legally binding policy
document.51 Multiple articles, which report ﬁerce opposition to
national smoke-free legislation, provide further evidence of con-
tinuing tobacco industry opposition to binding, enforceable
tobacco control policy.2 3 6 21 22 52–56 By emphasising the
importance of the legislative context and policy speciﬁc factors,
this paper contributes to the existing literature which reﬂects on
the industry’s strategic adaptation to different political real-
ities,57 58 highlighting the need for nuanced and contextual ana-
lyses of tobacco industry opposition. It also reminds those with
an interest in effective tobacco control that opponents will
respond most forcefully to policies that are most likely to be
effective and pose the highest threat to commercial interests.
While the importance of context-speciﬁc factors means that
the ﬁndings cannot be generalised, our study provides valuable
insights into the complexities of tobacco companies’ engage-
ment with each other and other sectors, the dynamics which
shape opposition to tobacco control policy at EU level, and the
impediments to developing effective EU tobacco control policy.
Our indepth analysis of the diverse approaches which oppo-
nents pursued in countering comprehensive EU smoke-free
policy highlights the contrast between some tobacco companies’
decision to overtly oppose comprehensive smoke-free policy
and the seemingly more circumscribed opposition by other
actors. The ﬁndings demonstrate the difﬁculties opponents
faced when justifying their resistance to EU smoke-free policy
and their limited success in reiterating well-known arguments
and tactics to counter tobacco control. The CECCM-led alliance
subsequently focused its efforts on disputing any reference in
the policy document to binding EU level tobacco regulation,
arguing for more consultations with tobacco industry represen-
tatives, criticising DG SANCO’s approach to policy
development and instigating division among European
Commission DGs. Importantly, the ﬁndings point to a consider-
able reluctance among non-tobacco actors, notably
pan-European organisations representing the commercial sector,
to openly join such opposition and publicly counter the policy
proposal. This contrasts with historical accounts depicting
umbrella organisations as serving tobacco industry interests19
and commercial actors as willing to ally with tobacco companies
in opposing regulation,59 possibly indicating increasing commer-
cial actors’ concern about tarnishing their public image through
agreeing with tobacco industry interests and reluctance to ally
with tobacco companies. Our analysis also shows that tobacco
companies contested DG SANCO’s approach to guarding
against tobacco industry interference in the policy development
and that tobacco control advocates’ rhetoric on the need to
protect tobacco control from tobacco industry interests was
crucial in isolating the industry. This analysis testiﬁes to the sig-
niﬁcance of FCTC Article 5.3 and its considerable potential to
hamper industry inﬂuence on policymaking and strengthen
tobacco control.
Complementing previous research, which analyses tobacco
companies’ differential political positions and strategies in
opposing tobacco taxation in the Czech Republic,58 this study
highlights the different approaches which PMI, ISTC and the
CECCM-led alliance pursued in countering the policy proposal.
Consistent with recent industry efforts to use harm reduction to
increase corporate credibility and improve access to policy-
makers,60 PMI and ISTC focused on directing political attention
to the potential role of smokeless tobacco in alleviating SHS
harms. Our study covers a time period (2006–2009) when
tobacco companies were investing extensively in smokeless
tobacco and starting to publicly engage in harm reduction
debates.60 61 Introducing a harm reduction narrative into the
debates on EU smoke-free policy seemed to be a strategic move
aimed at creating opportunities to present themselves as socially
responsible corporations and legitimate political stakeholders.
Our analysis, therefore, provides early evidence of tobacco com-
panies’ strategic thinking and suggests that tobacco companies
seized debates on EU smoke-free policies to highlight purported
beneﬁts of, and develop their narrative about, harm reduced
tobacco products and promote policies which would facilitate
market access of these products. Recent industry responses to
the revised EU tobacco products directive show continuity in
claims that alternative tobacco products are effective aids when
reducing or quitting smoking and that the EU inhibits develop-
ment of less harmful products by banning certain forms of
tobacco.51 The presented evidence of PMI’s and ISTC’s strategic
use of harm reduction discourse to publicly depict common
ground with tobacco control goals is reiterated by research indi-
cating that harm reduction debates assist tobacco companies in
demonstrating alignment with public health interests and
rebuilding of their corporate legitimacy.60 It thus corroborates
concerns that such debates might help tobacco companies to
overcome their relative isolation and re-enter the policy arena,
undermining FCTC Article 5.3.60
Our study is, to the best of our knowledge, one of three60 58
which present data from interviews with tobacco industry repre-
sentatives to investigate industry opposition to tobacco control.
While we acknowledge both the limitations which inevitably
arise from the small number of industry respondents and the
issues associated with engaging with tobacco industry represen-
tatives, the interviews with tobacco industry representatives and
other opponents generated valuable information which would
not have otherwise been obtained. This study shows that
6 Weishaar H, et al. Tob Control 2015;0:1–8. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2014-052007
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explicitly seeking the views of those opposed to tobacco
control, rather than relying on documentary data or third party
accounts, can help to develop a nuanced and comprehensive
understanding of opposition, intraindustry dynamics and the
complexities of tobacco companies’ political engagement and
alliance building.
CONCLUSION
Our ﬁndings highlight the potential oversimpliﬁcation of por-
traying diverse tobacco companies and related organisations as a
monolithic body. The presentation of such actors as ‘big
tobacco’62 has served to raise awareness about shared interests
in tobacco production and consumption and the undermining
of tobacco control, while reference to “the industry and its
allies” has highlighted tobacco companies’ successes in working
through surrogates and front groups.58 Research on the lack of
unity between tobacco companies, their varying strategies to
engage in policymaking, and the barriers to alliance building
with non-tobacco actors illuminates complex dynamics of indus-
try interactions, with potentially signiﬁcant implications for
policy analysis and health advocacy.
What this study adds
▸ Opposition to EU smoke-free policy was of limited scope
and intensity, reﬂecting the low priority that opponents
afforded to the non-binding policy proposal, reluctance to
oppose a policy initiative which was clearly framed around
public health and strategic efforts to present themselves as
constructive stakeholders.
▸ Tobacco companies pursued different lobbying strategies,
with a Confederation of European Community Cigarette
Manufacturers (CECCM)-led alliance opposing the policy,
and Philip Morris’ (PMI) and International Smokeless
Tobacco Company Inc (ISTC) using the debates on EU
smoke-free policy to initiate harm reduction debates.
▸ Hoping to avoid being associated with the tobacco industry
and facing difﬁculties in building consensus among
members, pan-European business organisations that had
previously allied with the tobacco industry did not publicly
oppose EU smoke-free policy.
▸ By analysing data from interviews with tobacco industry
representatives and tobacco control opponents, this paper
provides unique insights into the complex dynamics of
tobacco control opposition.
▸ The joint depiction of various tobacco-related actors as ‘big
tobacco’ risks over-simplifying the complexities of interaction
and alliance building among tobacco control opponents.
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